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Abstract
The paper investigates pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects of the use of
market share discounts (MSDs). While MSDs can be used for exploiting a
dominant position and may lead to a welfare reduction, MSDs also can serve
as an e¢ cient device for the creation of incentives. Particularly, if a nal
demand for an upstream manufacturers good depends on a promotional
e¤ort of a retailer, the manufacturer can e¤ectively use MSDs to induce
an optimal level of the retailers e¤ort. Moreover, it is possible that MSDs
have a positive impact both on the consumerssurplus and the total industry
prots. Thus the use of MSDs should not be treated as an anticompetitive
practice a priori, but rather it has to be judged on a case-by-case basis.
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1 Introduction
Vertical restraints, such as loyalty rebates, resale price maintenance, exclusive
dealing and exclusive territories are often used in the deal making between man-
ufacturers and retailers. In some cases vertical restraints serve anti-competitive
purposes by leading, for instance, to the market exclusion of competitors or to
the creation of entry barriers. In other cases these restraints are used to increase
e¢ ciency, for example, by eliminating double price marginalization, reaching an
optimal level of production or by creating the "right" incentive for vertically re-
lated rms. Still in all cases, vertical restraints are of considerable interest to
antitrust practitioners.
In this paper I analyze a special type of vertical restraints - market share dis-
counts (MSDs). In particular, I examine the incentives for manufacturers to apply
MSDs as well as the impact of MSDs on retailers investments in the promotion of
the manufacturers product and on welfare. MSDs are discounts that a manufac-
turer o¤ers to its distributors or retailers if their sales of the manufacturers brand
comprise a su¢ ciently high percentage of their total sales of a given class of goods.
Thus MSDs are a special type of discount which are based on the quantities of
goods that the retailer buys from both the manufacturer and its competitors.
The increasing number of cases related to such restraints conrms that manu-
facturers have begun to use this type of arrangements more intensively in recent
years1. The case of the Concord Boat Corporation versus the Brunswick Corpo-
ration is one of the well-known examples of the use of MSDs2. Brunswick manu-
factured and sold stern drive engines for recreational boats; it had a large share of
the market (i.e., 75% in 1983). Beginning in the early 1980s, Brunswick (like its
competitors) o¤ered market share discounts. Boat builder customers who agreed
to purchase a certain percentage of their engine requirements from Brunswick for
a period of time (often a year, sometimes longer) received a discount o¤ the list
price for all engines purchased3. Some of the boat builders sued Brunswick, alleg-
1See "Roundtable on loyalty or delity discounts and rebates", DAFFE meeting, May, 2002,
Tom et al [2000] and Kobayashi [2005] for review.
2See Concord BoatCorp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000)
3Particularly, an agreement to buy 70% of engine requirements from Brunswick might result
in a 3% discount, agreement for 65% a 2% discount, and an agreement for 60% a 1% discount.
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ing among other claims, that these discount programs excluded competing stern
drive engine manufacturers from the market and amounted to monopolization. A
court ruled that Brunswicks pricing amounted to de facto exclusive dealing, and
foreclosed rival suppliers of marine engines from the market. On appeal, that ruling
was reversed on grounds that market conditions were not conducive to foreclosure.
An additional example is the case of Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. versus British
Airways4. British Airways (BA) used incentive programs that provided travel
agencies with commissions, and corporate customers with discounts, for meeting
specied thresholds for sales of BA tickets (sometimes expressed in terms of market
share). Virgin Atlantic claimed that the result was below cost pricing on certain
transatlantic routes where Virgin and BA competed, with BAs attendant losses
being subsidized by monopoly pricing on other BA routes. Virgin alleged that the
below cost pricing slowed its expansion on the competitive routes. Both a district
court and a court of appeals concluded that Virgin had failed to demonstrate that
pricing was below cost.
In this paper I consider a vertically related two-level industry. At an upstream
level a manufacturer and a competitive rnge produce imperfect substitutes. At
a downstream level there is only one retailer which trades both goods to nal
consumers5. I consider two types of contract that manufacturer may o¤er to the
retailer: a wholesale price contract and a market share discount contract.
It is supposed that the retailer can make a costly e¤ort investment which
results in an increase in the demand for the manufacturers good. By assumption
this e¤ort has no e¤ects on the demand for the competitive sectors rms good.
The e¤ort level is non-contractable hence either the wholesale price or MSDs may
not be contingent on the retailers e¤ort level. However the manufacturer may use
either the wholesale price or MSDs in order to motivate the retailer to accept the
desired level of e¤ort. That allows us to analize the role of MSDs as a tool for the
creation of incentives as well as considering the welfare e¤ects of MSDs.
To highlight this role I begin with a consideration of a benchmark case - a
particular case of the model when the retailers e¤ort has no impact on demand.
Then I analyze the case when the e¤ort investment results in increasing the demand
4Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001).
5The similar setup is adopted in papers of Mills [2004] and Chioveanu and Akgun [2006].
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for the manufacturers good. For both cases and for both types of contract market
outcomes and welfare e¤ects are analyzed.
For the benchmark case the following result are shown. Compare to wholesale
price settings, if MSDs are applied, both the quantities of manufacturers good
and the manufacturers prot increase whilest the quantity of the good sold by
competitive sectors rm decreases. The total industry prot decreases as does
consumers surplus. Thus only the manufacturer gains from the use of MSDs.
That allows us to conclude that MSDs have an anticompetitive character in these
settings.
The main results obtained for the second case are the following. Firstly, if the
wholesale price contract is applied, the manufacturer may be not able to motivate
the retailer to undertake the desired level of e¤ort. In this case the market outcome
is the same as in the benchmark case of the use of wholesale price. If MSDs are
applied then the manufacturer can design the menu of prices in such a way that
the retailer makes the desired level of e¤ort: an e¢ cient one from the social point
of view. Moreover both the industry prot and the consumer surplus are higher in
the case of MSDs when compared with the wholesale price. Another important
result is that while the use of MSDs increases the manufacturers market share,
it does not drive competing rms out of the market completely. Thus in terms
of social welfare the outcome when MSDs are applied dominates the case of the
wholesale price.
Finally, combining the results obtained for both cases, I conclude that judg-
ments on whether MSDs have an anti- or procompetitive e¤ect depends crucially
on features of the market environment. While MSDs may serve for a redistribution
of prot between the manufacturer and the retailer and may lead to a decrease
in social welfare they may also serve as an e¢ cient instrument for the creation
investment incentives and may result in an increase in total social welfare. Thus
MSDs should not be treated as anticompetitive practices a priori, but rather the
treatment of MSDs should be on a case-by-case basis.
Although there is growing number of paper examining di¤erent aspects of
MSDs, pro- and anti-competitive e¤ects of the market share discounts have not
got enough attention in economic literature yet. The rent-shifting e¤ects of MSDs
are analyzed by Marx and Sha¤er [2004] and Greenlee and Reitman [2004]. Marx
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and Sha¤er [2004] examine the use of market share discounts, slotting allowances
and predatory pricing in a three-party sequential contracting environment. In their
model two sellers negotiate sequentially with one buyer. Market share discounts
and slotting allowances are used to shift rents between the contracting parties,
with no short run consequences for social welfare. One result is that this type of
rent shifting equilibrium generally results in both sellers remaining in the market.
In the long run, the authors suggest that preventing the use of such devices will
result in the adoption of strategies that are more likely to result in one of the
sellers being excluded. However, the model does not explicitly analyze the welfare
e¤ect of such long term e¤ects.
Greenlee and Reitman [2004] analyze the case of two competing rms selling
their goods to nal consumers by using loyalty rebates or wholesale price con-
tracts6. They found that in equilibrium only one rm applies market share dis-
count. Welfare e¤ects of the MSDs use depend on a structure of demand. The
welfare analysis in my paper shows also that the welfare e¤ects depend crucially
on a model specication.
Majumdar and Sha¤er [2007] analyze a case when one manufacturer and a
competitive fringe supply goods to a retailer who has private information about
the state of demand. They examine conditions under which market-share contracts
are protable, and show that the full-information outcome can be obtained. They
show as well that market-share discounts contracts are more protable than all-
units discounts contract.
Chioveanu and Akgun [2006] compare a manufacturers incentives to apply
market share discounts, all-unit discounts and incremental-unit discounts. They
show that in situation where there is full information all discounts are equivalent
from both manufacturers and social viewpoints. Under a situation of uncertainty,
the attitude toward risk of the retailer can play a crucial role in the form of the
loyalty discount applied by the manufacturer.
Greenlee et al [2004] analyze a use of bundled market share discounts by multi-
product monopolist. They show that it may exclude an equally e¢ cient competitor
that produces a single-product, and that the welfare e¤ect is ambiguous.
Ordover and Sha¤er [2007] show that when market share discounts are imple-
6The term "loyalty rebates" usually used as a synonym for market share discounts.
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mented by a dominant rm, who may have easier access to nancing compared to
a rival, it can sometimes exclude an equally-e¢ cient rival and lower overall welfare.
The theoretical literature on discounts has not generally considered e¢ ciency
based reasons for using market share discounts. One exception is Millss [2004] pa-
per. Mills has examined the competitive e¤ects of a vertically di¤erentiated prod-
uct manufacturer implementing market share discounts in sales to its distributors.
His central idea is that market share discounts are not mainly an exclusionary de-
vice, but rather a device for inducing merchandising services that help consumers
make well-informed decisions and augment market performance. In order to show
this Mills investigates a case where an upstream rm negotiates a separate con-
tract with every retailer to determine the size and the makeup of the rms joint
prots. In this case every downstream rm has an incentive to make an e¤ort to
promote the upstream rms good whenever it is optimal for social welfare. The
author then shows that the same result can be implemented by the upstream rm
when it uses MSDs. To get this result Mills (implicitly) assumes that the level
of promotion e¤ort of the downstream rm is contractable. This assumption is
crucial for getting Mills result. In contrast I assume that the e¤ort level is not
contractable and it allows to reveal a role of MSDs as an e¢ cient mechanism for
incentives creation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 considers the benchmark case. Section 4 analyses the general case.
Section 5 provides the welfare analysis and a numerical example and section 6
gives conclusions.
2 The Model
There is one retailer, R, which sells two substitutable goods to nal consumers.
The rst good is produced by a brand-name upstream manufacturer, M . It is
supposed that the brand manufacturer produces with a constant marginal cost,
c  0. The second good is produced by a competitive fringe. The marginal cost
of producion of the second good is zero.
It is supposed that the retailer can make a costly investment e¤ort which will
increase the demand for the manufacturers good. For example, the circumstances
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could exist whereby consumers are not perfectly informed about the quality of
manufacturers good and the retailer can provide consumers with that information.
The level of the e¤ort is discrete, e = f0; 1g. It is supposed that the e¤ort cannot
be made by the brand manufacturer and, moreover, that the level of e¤ort is not
contractable. A cost of e¤ort is denoted by E > 0.
A representative consumer has utility function of the form:
U(q1; q2) = A(e)q1 + q2   1
2
(q21 + 2bq1q2 + q
2
2); (1)
where q1; q2 are quantities purchased by the consumer, b 2 (0; 1);is the degree
of goods di¤erentiation and the parameter A depends on the retailers e¤ort level:
A(1) = A1  A(0) = 1: It is supposed that 1  b  c > 0. The consumers surplus
is:
CS(q1; q2; p1; p2) = A(e)q1 + q2   1
2
(q21 + 2bq1q2 + q
2
2)  q1p1   q2p2:
The utility function (1) generates the demand for the manufacturers good, p1 =
A(e)   q1   bq2; which depends on the retailers e¤ort level, and the demand for
the competitive sectors rms good p2 = 1   q2   bq1, which does not depend on
the level of e¤ort.
I consider two types of contract that the manufacturer may use in dealing with
the retailer: a wholesale price contract, which species a constant per-unit price,
!, and market-share discounts. In the latter case the manufacturers contract
species parameters ftL; tH ; sg that form a menu of prices:
tMSD =
(
tL if s  s
tH if s < s
; (2)
where s = q1=(q1 + q2) denote the share of the manufacturers good in a total
sales of the retailer, s is the market share threshold that the retailer must meet in
order to buy at the reduced price tL, and the price tH : tH > tL is the manufacturers
price in the case where the retailer does not meet the market share requirement.
Lets t denote either the single price ! or the menu of prices tMSD depending
on the type of contract applied.
7
All producers compete on price and as a result competitive sectors rms set
prices equal to the marginal cost and obtain zero prot because of competition a
la Bertrand among them.
The retailers prot is:
R = (A(e)  q1   bq2   t)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2   eE:
The prot of the brand manufacturer is:
M = q1(t  c)
where t is either the wholesale price or the menu of prices.
The timing in the model is the following.
At the rst stage the manufacturer and competitive sectors rms simultane-
ously set their prices. The manufacturer sets the menu of prices, tMSD of the form
(2) or the wholesale price !.
At the second stage the retailer takes a decision on the e¤ort level e = f0; 1g
and levels of quantities q1 and q2.
The model analysis is presented in the following way. I begin with investigation
of a special case of the model when A1 = A0 = 1. This case is considered as a
benchmark for a comparison with a general case A1 > A0 = 1: The condition
A1 = A0 implies that the retailers e¤ort has no e¤ects on the consumers demand
and that the manufacturer has no reason to motivate the retailer to undertake
the costly e¤ort. For both wholesale price and MSD contracts I analyze market
outcomes and examine an e¤ect of the contract type on welfare. That allows us
to see whether MSDs have a procompetitive or an anticompetitive e¤ect in the
benchmark settings.
Then I examine the role of the type of contract (wholesale price vs. MSDs)
in the case when the consumers demand depends on the retailers e¤ort level,
A1 > A0 = 1. Again I consider market outcomes for both types of contract.
Prot functions are subscribed by indexesMSD andWP for cases whenMSDs
and the wholesale price is applied respectively.
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3 Benchmark case: No investment e¤ort
3.1 Wholesale price contract
First let us consider the retailers problem:
max
q1;q2
RWP (q1; q2;!) = (1  q1   bq2   !)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2:
The solutions for the rst order conditions are: q1(!) = 1 b !2(1 b2) ; q2(!) =
1 b+b!
2(1 b2) .
The prot of the retailer as a function of the price ! is:
RWP (!) =
2  2b(1  !)  2! + !2
4(1  b2) :
Now the problem of the manufacturer can be written as:
max
!
RWP (!) = q1(!)(!   c) =
1  b  !
2(1  b2) (!   c)
and it has the solution: ! = 1
2
(1  b+ c).
The market outcome is characterized by quantities produced by the manu-
facturer and competitive sectors rms,
n
qWP1 =
1 b c
4(1 b2) , q
WP
2 =
2 b b2+bc
4(1 b2)
o
, the
price of the manufacturer, ! = 1
2
(1   b + c), the nal markets prices fpWP1 =
1
4
(3   b + c), pWP2 = 12g and the prots of the retailer and the manufacturer,
fRWP = 5 3b
2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) , 
M
WP =
(1 b c)2
8(1 b2) g.
3.2 MSD contract
The retailers prot maximization problem is:
max
q1;q2
RMSD(q1; q2; tMSD) = (1  q1   bq2   tMSD)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2
s.t. tMSD =
(
tL if s  s
tH if s < s
Note, if the retailer trades the good of rms from competitive sector then its
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prot is a solution of the problem:
max
q2
R = (1  q2)q2
and it is equal to 1=4: This value plays a role of the retailers "reservation prot" in
a sense that the retailer would be guaranteed at least this prot level in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium values of ftL; tH ; sg are such that the retailer meets
the market share threshold, s  s.
Proof. See the Appendix
Lemma 1 says that in equilibrium the manufacturers price tMSD is such that
the retailer always meets the market share threshold and buys at the price tL. The
intuition is the following. If the retailer does not meet the threshold, that is s < s,
and it buys at the price tH then the outcome does not change if the manufacturer
sets prices ft0L; t0H ; s0g such that t0L = tH , s0 = s and t0H is the prohibitively high.
Now, if the manufacturer increases the market share threshold slightly s0 > s then
the retailer buys more for the same price and the manufacturers prot is higher.
Thus s < s cannot stay in equilibrium.
Hence the exact value of the manufacturers price tH does not play a role
provided it is high enough. Without loss of generality we can put tH = +1.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium it must be that s = s.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that if under equilibrium the case was produced where s 6= s this would
imply that the market outcome is the same as in the case of wholesale price and
the manufacturer has no possibility of increasing its prot by setting appropriate
levels of s and tL, which is contra-intuitive.
As a result of the Corollary 1, the prot of the retailer can be written as:
max
q1;q2
RMSD(q1; q2; tL) = (1  q1   bq2   tL)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2
s.t.
q1
(q1 + q2)
= s:
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The rst order condition gives the solution:
q1(tL; s) =
s(1  stL)
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) :
Thus the retailers prot as a function of tL and s is
RMSD(tL; s) =
(1  stL)2
4(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) :
The manufacturers prot maximization problem now can be written as:
max
tL;s
MMSD = q1(tL; s)(tL   c);
s.t. q1(tL; s) =
(
s(1 stL)
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) if 
R
MSD(tL; s)  14
0 if RMSD(tL; s) <
1
4
:
Lemma 2 In equilibrium the manufacturer extracts the entire retailers prot
above the reservation prot level.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The last proposition means that under equilibrium, the equality RMSD(tL; s) =
1
4
holds. This gives a correspondence between a price tL and market share threshold
s which must hold in the equilibrium:
s(tL) =
2(1  b  tL)
2(1  b)  t2L
: (3)
Now the prot maximization problem of the manufacturer becomes:
max
tL
MMSD(tL) = q1(s(tL); tL)(tL   c) =
1  b  tL
2(1  tL)(1  b) + t2L
(tL   c)
and it has the unique solution:
tL =
(2  c)(1  b) D1
1  b  c ; (4)
where D1 = const =
p
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2].
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Plugging (4) into (3), we obtain the equilibrium values of s which together
with tL determines other equilibrium values.
The market outcome is characterized by quantities produced by the manufac-
turer and competitive sectors rms,
n
q1 =
1 b c
2D1
, q2 =
1 b+bc
2D1
o
, the market share
threshold, s = 1 b c
(1 b)(2 c) ; the manufacturers price, t

L =
(2 c)(1 b) D1
1 b c , the nal
market prices fp1 = 2D1 (1 b
2)(1 c)
2D1
, p2 =
2D1+b2 1
2D1
g and the prots of the retailer
and the manufacturer, fRMSD = 1=4, MMSD = D1+b
2 1
2(1 b2) g.
Lets note that b(1 c) < 1 implies s = 1 b c
(1 b)(2 c) < 1. Hence we can formulate
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Although the share of the manufacturer is higher in the case of
the use of MSDs, the manufacturer never sets the market threshold equals to 1.
Thus the competitive sector never moved from the market completely and
MSDs do not result in an exclusive relation7. The intuition here is the following.
According to (3) the higher the market share threshold s the lower the price tL
maust be in order to provide the retailers with its reservation prot level. Thus
to implement s = 1 the manufacturer has to set tL = 0; which does not maximize
its prot.
3.3 MSDs vs. wholesale price contracts
In the following, I compare the outcomes in the case of MSDs with those in the
case of the wholesale price contract.
Proposition 2 Comparing with the wholesale price contract the use of MSDs
leads to the following
1) an increase in the manufacturers market share, s;
2) the retailer buys at higher price, that is tL > !;
3) an increase in the manufacturers output, q1;
4) an increase in the manufacturers prot,
5) a decrease in the nal market price for the manufacturers good p1,
7This result contributes to a discussion in the antitrust law literature (see for example Tom
at al[2000]) on a relation between MSDs and exclusive dealing. See Bernheim and Whinston
[1998], Katzs [1989] survey, Marvel [1982], Mathewson and Winter [1987] on exclusive dealing.
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6) an increase in the nal market price for the good p2,
7) a decrease in the output of competitive sectors rms q2,
8) a decrease in the retailers prot,
9) a decrease in the consumer surplus.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus the manufacturer, which has some degree of market power, uses MSDs
to increase both its output and price and to extract the entire prot of the retail-
erabove the reservation level. In the case of MSDs all agents, with the exception
of the manufacturer, lose. Hence, under the presented environmental conditions,
MSDs can be treated as an anticompetitive tool.
4 Investment E¤ort.
4.1 Wholesale price contract
The prot maximization problem for the retailer is:
max
q1;q2;e
RWP = (A(e)  q1   bq2   !)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2   eE
where e 2 f0; 1g, A(0) = 1, A(1) = A1.
The rst order conditions in respect to q2 and q1 are:(
A(e)  2q1   2bq2   ! = 0
1  2bq1   2q2 = 0
:
It gives a solution: q1(!; e) =
A(e) b !
2(1 b2) , q2(!; e) =
1 A(e)b+b!
2(1 b2) .
The retailers prot as a function of the e¤ort level e and the price ! is:
RWE(!; e) =
(A(e) !)(A(e) b !)
4(1 b2) +
1 A(e)b+b!
4(1 b2)   eE.
Retailers prot functions for di¤erent levels of the investment e¤ort, RWP (!; e)

e=0
and RWP (!; e)

e=1
; are decreasing in ! functions with the following relation on
slopes:
@RWP (!; e)
@!

e=1
=
 2A1 + 2b+ 2t
4(1  b2) <
 2 + 2b+ 2t
4(1  b2) =
@RWP (!; e)
@!

e=0
: (5)
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Lets b! denote the price such that the retailer is indi¤erent either to make the
investment e¤ort e = 1 or e = 0: The solution of RWP (b!; e)e=1 = RWP (b!; e)e=0
is
b! = 1
2
(A1 + 1  2b)  2E(1  b
2)
A1   1 ;
and the following conditions hold: if ! < b! then the retailers prot is higher if it
makes the e¤ort e = 1 and if ! > b! then the retailers prot is higher if its level of
the e¤ort is e = 0: Together with (5) it implies that the lower is the price !, the
higher is the retailers gain from the investment e¤ort, RWP (!; 1)  RWP (!; 0):
Now lets restrict parameters of the model to rule out trivial cases.
Assumption 1. b! > 0:
Assumption 2. b! < 1
2
(1  b+ c):
Assumption 3. A1 b b!
2(1 b2) (b!   c) < (1 b c)28(1 b2) :
Assumption 4. b(A1 + c) < 1:
Assumption 1 says that if the manufacturers price is low enough, ! 2 (0; b!];
then the retailer makes the investment e¤ort. It may be rewritten in the form:
(A1 1)(A1+1+2b)
4(1 b2) > E and it rules out cases when the cost of e¤ort is "too high"
(E ! +1) or the result of the e¤ort investment is "too small" (A1  1). If
assumption 1 does not hold there is no possibility of implementing the level of
e¤ort e = 1:
Assumption 2 may be rewritten in the form (A1 1)(A1 b c)
4(1 b2) < E and it implies
that the e¤ort cost is not "too small" or that the e¤ect of the e¤ort investment is
not "too high". It is outside of our interest because in this case the retailer makes
the e¤ort investment regardless of the type of contract with the manufacturer.
Assumption 3 may be written in the form:
E >
(A1   1)[(1  b  c) +
p
(A1   1)(A+ 1  2b  2c)
4(1  b2)
and it implies that neither the e¤ect or the e¤ort should be "too high" or the
cost of e¤ort "too low". In addition it implies that the rate of goods substitution
should not be close to 1:
Whilst assumption 1 implies the possibility of implementation of the e¤ort level
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e = 1 and assumptions 2 implies that the e¤ort e = 1 is not implemented with
necessity under equilibrium, assumption 3 allows us to concentrate on a case that
reveals the role of MSDs as a tool for the creation of investment incentives.
Assumption 4 states that the degree of goods substitution should not be close
to 1: Moreover, the higher the level of e¢ ciency of the e¤ort the lower the degree
of goods substitution should be.
The prot maximization problem of the manufacturer may be written in the
form:
max
!
MWP = q1(!; e)(!   c) =
(
A1 b !
2(1 b2) (!   c) if !  b!
1 b !
2(1 b2)(!   c) if ! > b! :
Note that in equilibrium the optimal manufacturers price does not exceed
the level (A1   b + c): Thus the manufacturers prot function has the following
properties: it is kinked at point b! and it increases at both intervals ! 2 [0; b!] and
! 2 (b!; 1
2
(A1  b+ c)]. If ! 2 [0; b!] then the equilibrium e¤ort level is e = 1, while
if ! 2 (b!; 1
2
(A1   b+ c)] then e = 0:
The immediate result of assumption 2 is that in order to implement the level
of e¤ort e = 1 the manufacturer sets the price ! = b! and gets the prot:
max
!2[0;b!]MWP = MWP

!=b! = A1   b  b!2(1  b2) (b!   c) (6)
Now lets consider us the manufacturers prot for the price ! 2 (b!; 1
2
(A1  
b + c)]. While ! > b! the retailer does not undertake the investment e¤ort and
the manufacturers prot MWP =
1 b !
2(1 b2)(!  c) reaches the maximum at the point
! = 1
2
(1  b+ c) with
max
!>b! MWP (!; e) =
(1  b  c)2
8(1  b2) : (7)
According to assumption 3 the manufacturers prot is higher if it sets the price
! = 1
2
(1  b+ c) and level of investment of zerois implemented in equilibrium.
Thus given assumptions 1-3 if the wholesale price contract applied the manufac-
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turers prot maximization implies a retailer e¤ort of zero. This immediately has
the result in that the equilibrium outcome coincides with the benchmark wholesale
price outcome.
4.2 MSD contract
The prot maximization problem of the retailer is:
max
q1;q2;e
RMSD = (A(e)  q1   bq2   tMSD)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2   eE (8)
Lemma 3 Under equilibrium the condition s = s holds and the manufacturers
price tH is prohibitively high.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence under equilibrium the retailer chooses q1, q2 such that q1=(q1 + q2) = s
and buys at the price tL. Plugging q2 = q1 1 ss into (8) and solving the rst order
conditions we get the optimal level of q1:
q1(s; tL; e) =
s(1 + s(A(e)  1  tL))
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) :
Given ftL; sg the retailer makes the e¤ort if and only if(
RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 1
4
; (9)
where the retailers prot is:
RMSD(e; tL; s) =
(1  s+ s(A(e)  tL)2
4(1  2s(1  b)(1  s))   eE:
The rst inequality in (9) is an incentives constraint and it implies that for the
retailer it is protable to make the e¤ort e = 1. The second inequality in (9) is a
participation constraint and it implies that the prot of the retailer is greater or
equal to its reservation prot.
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If the values of ftL; sg are such that(
RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
 1
4
(10)
then the retailer chooses the e¤ort e = 0.
Now the manufacturers prot maximization problem is:
max
tL;s
MMSD = q1(tL; s)(tL   c), (11)
s.t. q1(tL; s) =
8>><>>:
s(1+s(A(e) 1 tL))
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) if the condition (9) holds
s(1 s tL)
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) if the condition (10) holds
0 otherwise
Lets rst consider the manufacturers prot in the case where the price tMSD
is such that condition (9) holds which implies that the retailer makes the e¤ort
e = 1.
Lemma 4 In equilibrium the manufacturer extracts the entire retailers prot
above the reservation level.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus the condition RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 1
4
binds and this determine the equi-
librium correspondence on tL and s of the form:
tL(s) = A1   1 + 1 
p
1 + 4E
p
1  2s(1  b)(1  s)
s
(12)
Plugging (12) into the manufacturers prot function (11) and solving the rst
order conditions we get the optimal value of s:
s =
A1   b  c
(1  b)(1 + A1   c) :
Now, the optimal value of tL is:
tL = A1   1 +
(1  b)(A1 + 1  c) D2
A1   b  c ;
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where D2 = const =
p
(1  b2)(1 + (A1   c)(A1   c  2b)
p
(1 + 4E):
The prot of the manufacturer is
RMSD(t

L; s
; e)

e=1
=
(1 + 4E)(1 + (A  c)(A  c  2b) D2)
2D2
:
Thus by setting ftL = A1   1 + (1 b)(A1+1 c) D2A1 b c , tH = 1, s = A1 b c(1 b)(1+A1 c)g
the manufacturer motivates the retailer to make the e¤ort investment e = 1.
The prots fMMSD

e=1
= (1+4E)(1+(A c)(A c 2b) D2)
2D2
, RME

e=1
= 1=4g, the outputs
fq1 = (A1 b c)(1+4E)2D2 , q2 =
(1 Ab+bc)(1+4E)
2D2
g and prices fp1 = A1   (4E+1)(A1 c)(1 b2)2D2 ,
p2 = 1  (4E+1)(1 b2)2D2 g are realized in this case.
Now lets consider the prot of the manufacturer in the case where it motivates
the retailer to choose a zero-level e¤ort. Given the price tL and the threshold s
the retailers prot is RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
= (1 stL)
2
4(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) . The manufacturers
maximization problem is:
max
tL;s
MMSD =
s(1  stL)
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s))(tL   c);
s.t. (10) holds
The participation constraint RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
= 1
4
gives the correspondence tL(s)
that guarantees the reservation level of the prot to the retailer:
tL(s) =
1 p1  2s(1  b)(1  s)
s
: (13)
Plugging (13) into (11) and solving the rst order conditions we get the optimal
value of s = 1 b c
(1 b)(2 c) :
The optimal value of tL is:
tL =
(1  b)(2  c) D3
1  b  c ,
where D3 = const =
p
(1  b2)(1 + (1  c)(1  c  2b).
The prot of the manufacturer in this case is
MMSD(tL; s; e)

e=0
=
1 + (1  c)(1  c  2b) D3
2D3
:
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Thus if
MMSD(t

L(e); s
(e); e)

e=1
 MMSD(tL(e); s(e); e)

e=0
(14)
the manufacturer sets the price tL = A1   1 + (1 b)(A1+1 c) D2A1 b c ; market share
threshold s = A1 b c
(1 b)(1+A1 c) and the equilibrium retailers level of the e¤ort is
e = 1, otherwise the manufacturer sets the price tL =
(1 b)(2 c D3)
1 b c ; the market
share threshold s = 1 b c
(1 b)(2 c) and the equilibrium level for the retailers e¤ort is
e = 0. For the purpose of the paper I am interested in the former case. Lets 

denote the set of parameters (A1, b, c, E) for which conditions (14), assumptions 1-
3 and the incentives compatibility constraint hold. The following technical lemma
states that the set 
 is the non-degenerated set.
Lemma 5 There is a compact set of the parameters of the model (A1; b; c; E) 2 

where inequalities (14), (9) and assumptions 1, 2, 3 are compatible.
Proof. The numerical example in part 5.1 proves that it contains at least one
point. Moreover because all functions used in (14) and assumptions 1-3 are con-
tinuous the required conditions hold in the neighborhood of the provided point.
The set 
 is characterized by the following properties. For given levels of the
marginal cost c and the degree of the rate substitution b the set species the cost
of e¤ort as a function of the e¢ ciency of the e¤ort A1 : 0 < E(A1; b; c) < E 
E(A1; b; c); where boundsE;E increase in.A1:For a given level ofA1 the higher level
of b corresponds to a smaller interval [E;E]: For instance, if c = 0; A1 = 1:5; b = 0:5
then 
 = fE : E 2 [0:166; 0:253]g; if c = 0; A1 = 1:5; b = 0:6 then 
 = fE : E 2
[0:1758; 0:2556]g and if c = 0; A1 = 1:4; b = 0:5 then 
 = fE : E 2 [0:12; 0:1892]g:
Thus market share discounts allow to the manufacturer to design the menu
of prices such that the retailer makes the level of the e¤ort e = 1 while if the
wholesale price contract is applied, the manufacturer implements the level of the
e¤ort e = 0.
Hence we can conclude that MSDs can be used by the manufacturer as an e¢ -
cient device for the creation of investment incentives. Certainly, the manufacturer
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gains from the use of MSDs. In order to analyze MSDs impacts from the social
point of view I conduct a welfare analysis.
5 Welfare analysis
The representative consumer surplus is:
U(q1; q2) = A(e)q1 + q2   1
2
(q21 + 2bq1q2 + q
2
2)  q1p1   q2p2:
Proposition 3 For the set of parameters 
 the set of statements following is true:
1. When MSDs are applied, the manufacturer designs the menu of prices such
that the retailers level of the e¤ort is e = 1 When the wholesale price is applied
the level of e¤ort e = 0 is implemented under equilibrium.
2. The total industry prot is higher when MSDs are applied.
3. The total output is higher when MSDs are applied.
4. Both the consumer surplus and the total welfare are higher when MSDs are
applied.
Proof. The proposition immediately follows the numerical example in part 5.1
and Lemma 5
The intuition here is the following. The retailer is motivated to make the
costly e¤ort only if the quantity of the manufacturers good that it resells is high
enough. That means that the manufacturers wholesale price should be small
enough to achieve this. Thus the manufacturer faces a trade-o¤: either to set a
lower wholesale price to shift the demand upward or to set a higher price and
to remain ot the same demand curve. The gain by the manufacturer from an
increase in the demand can be smaller than its losses from the price reduction.
Thus the wholesale price contract may not be enough to implement the desired
level of e¤ort from the retailer. If MSDs are applied then the manufacturer may
use the market threshold to enforce the retailer to buy more of the manufacturers
good, up to the level where the costly e¤ort becomes protable for the retailer.
The investment e¤ort shifts the demand for the manufacturers good and increases
both the manufacturers prot and the consumers surplus.
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5.1 A numerical example
Lets consider a numerical example with the following values for the parameters:
A1 = 1:5; b = 0:7; c = 0:14; E = 0:2.
First I consider the case of the wholesale price !. Given these parameters for
the model the retailer is indi¤erent to making the e¤ort investment or not, if and
only if
RWP (!; e)

e=0
= RWP (!; e)

e=1
;
that is
(1  !)(1  b  !)
4(1  b2) +
1  b+ b!
4(1  b2) =
(A1   !)(A1   b  !)
4(1  b2) +
1  A1b+ b!
4(1  b2)  E;
with the solution
b! = (A1   1)[A1 + 1  2b)]  4E(1  b2)
2(A1   1) = 0:142:
The manufacturers prot in this case is:
MWP (b!) = q1(b!)(b!   c) = A1   b  b!2(1  b2) (b!   c) = 0:0009:
For any price above the b! = 0:142 the retailer chooses a level of e¤ort of zero.
The wholesale price ! that maximizes the manufacturers prot is ! = 1
2
(1  
b+ c) = 0:22 and the prot is
MWP =
1  b  !
2(1  b2) (!   c) = 0:61  0:078 = 0:006:
Thus the investment e¤ort e = 0 is implemented.
The equilibrium prices and quantities are (pWP1 ; p
WP
2 ) = (0:61; 0:5) and (q
WP
1 ; q
WP
2 ) =
(0:0784; 0; 445) respectively; the prot of the retailer is RWP = 0:2531; the con-
sumer surplus is CSWP = 0:1266. Thus the total surplus is TSWP = 0:3857.
If MSDs applied then the manufacturer sets the price tL = 0:161 and the
market share threshold s = 0:9322 in order to implement the e¤ort investment level
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e = 1:The retailer may choose either scenario indi¤erently. The rst being to make
the e¤ort (e = 1) and to set the optimal prices (pMSD1 ; p
MSD
2 ) = (0:83; 0:507). The
quantities in this case are (qMSD1 ; q
MSD
2 ) = (0:6375; 0; 046). The second scenario
is not to trade the manufacturers good at all and to set p2 = 1=2 and q2 = 1=2.
The retailers prot in both cases is RMSD = 1=4. It is assumed that in this
case the retailer makes the investment e¤ort . Then the manufacturers prot is
MWSD = 0:0134; the consumer surplus is CS
MSD = 0:225. Thus the total surplus
is TSMSD = 0:488. If the retailer chooses the e¤ort level e = 0 its prot is
0:1878 < 0:25. Thus, given ftL = 0:161,s = 0:9322g the equilibrium level of the
e¤ort is e = 1: To implement the e¤ort level e = 0 the manufacturer may set
the price tL = 0:221 and s = 0:287. The manufacturers prot in this case is
0:0123 < 0:0134: Thus if MSDs are applied then the equilibrium e¤ort level is
e = 1:
The results conrmed in the example are the following: comparing with the
wholesale price MSDs result in:
1) an increase in the manufacturers output, q1; and a decrease in the compet-
itive sectors rms output q2;
2) an increase in the manufacturers prot and a decrease in the retailers prot,
3) the retailer buys at the lower price, that is tL < !;
4) an increase in both the nal market prices p1 and p2,
5) an increase in the total industrys prot, an increase in the consumer surplus
and, as a result, an increase in the total welfare.
5.2 Policy implication
As it was shown the manufacturer may increase its prot by applying the MSDs
contract instead of the WP contract. When this results in an implementation of
socially preferable level of the e¤ort it has a positive impact on both the manu-
facturers prot and social surplus. In other cases the manufacturer uses MSDs
for rent-shifting purposes that results in a decrease in total welfare. Thus it is
important to have tests which allow an antitrust authority to distinguish between
these cases.
Suppose the manufacturer, which has a certain degree of market power, changes
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the type of contract it o¤ers to the retailer from the WP contract to the MSD
contract. Because parameters of the utility function are not observable in practices
and usually the cost of production is a companys private information it may
not be possible to judge the manufacturers incentives ex ante, that is before the
new outcome is realized. On the contrary, the antitrust authority may judge the
procompetitive or anticompetitive character of the use of MSDs based on the
observable characteristic of market outcomes ex post. Thus when the quantities of
goods sold by the retailer and all prices are known for cases when WP and MSDs
are applied, a test based on changes in the manufacturer price may be proposed.
If the adoption of the MSDs contract results in the e¤ort level e = 1 it implies
that the price tMSDL

e=1
< !, while if MSDs serve for the rent shifting between
the retailer and the manufacturer the price tMSDL

e=0
> !. Intuition here tell us
that the investment e¤ort is protable for the retailer if it sells a high enough
quantity of the good 1 and to reach it the manufacturer uses both the market
share threshold s and the price tMSDL :Thus to implement e¤ort level e = 1 the
manufacturer sets its price to be low enough, particularly lower than its wholesale
price.
6 Conclusion
The paper investigates e¤ects of the use of MSDs. In the rst part of the model the
case without the possibility of is considered. It is shown that the manufacturer,
who has some degree of market power, can use MSDs to extract an additional
prot through an increase in its market share and a decrease in the market share of
its competitors. In this way, the use of MSDs use can be treated as anticompetitive
because it leads to a decrease in both the total industry prot and the consumer
surplus.
The second part of the analysis considers the case where the retailer is able to
make a costly e¤ort investment that increases the demand for the manufacturers
good. In this case MSDs can be used to motivate the retailer to make an e¢ cient
level of investment e¤ort. This happens because the MSDs use guarantees that
the quantity of the manufacturers good sold by the retailer is high enough and
this provides the incentives for the retailer to make the e¤ort investment. It is
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shown that this outcome can not always be reached through the use of a wholesale
price contract. The main result is that MSDs can lead to an increase in both the
total industry prot and the social surplus. Hence the total welfare in the case of
MSDs may be higher compare with the case of the wholesale price.
One possible extension of the model may be in a consideration of the case of
many heterogeneous retailers. It may be found that in this case the optimal menu
of prices should include as many non-degenerated price as well as market thresh-
olds, as many retailers are at the downstream level. That may allow satisfaction of
the incentives compatibility constraints for each of them separately. At the same
time as the manufacturer designs the optimal price menu it must take into account
that the required market share threshold may be reached by a retailer by means
of a just reduction of the share of competitors without making a costly e¤ort in-
vestment. Thus, to expand results presented for the case of many retailers, a deep
formal analysis of the extended model is required.
Another possible extension of the model is in the comparison of the result
of the use of MSDs with the results of other non-linear price schemes. There
is particular interest in comparison of MSDs and quantity discounts. Quantity
discounts usually are not considered as anticompetitive discounts and their use
is not restricted by law. If it is shown that MSDs are more preferable from the
social point of view than quantity discounts, it will give more reasons to treat
MSDs as an e¢ ciency increasing, procompetitive tool. One possibility of getting
this result may be in consideration of a case of stochastic demand when the use
of quantity discounts can involve di¢ culties related to the absolute value of a
discount threshold. MSDs may be free of these di¢ culties in the case where both
demands, for the manufacturers good and for the competitive sectors rms good,
have the same shock. I leave these extensions for future investigation.
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A Appendix
Proof of the Lemma 1. I proof the statement by contradiction.
Suppose, in the equilibrium the manufacturer sets fteL; teH ; seg and the retailer
does not meet the market share threshold. That is s = q
e
1
qe1+q
e
2
< se, where fqe1; qe2g
and s are equilibrium quantities and the equilibrium market share of the manu-
facturer respectively.
Because in the equilibrium the market threshold restriction is not met, the
level of the market threshold se has no e¤ect on market outcome. In this case
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the equilibrium price teH coincides with one in the case of wholesale price t
e
H =
1
2
(1  b+ c). As a result, the equilibrium retailers prot equals one in the case of
the wholesale price, RMSD =
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) .
Note that the retailers prot is higher than its reservation prot. It is because
of:
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) >
1
4
, 5 3b2 2b(1  c)  (2  c)c > 4(1  b2), (b+ c)2 
2(b+ c) + 1 > 0, (1  b  c)2 > 0,
were the last inequality is obviously true.
Lets construct new menu of prices t0 = ft0L; t0H ; s0g in the form:8><>:
t0L = t
e
H
t0H = +1
s0 = se + 
,
where  > 0.
Now lets show that the new price t0 gives the higher prot to the manufacturer.
Because t0H = +1, the retailer has either to meet the market share threshold
or to trade the competitive sectors rms good only. In the latter case its prot
equals to the reservation prot. In the former case, the retailer faces the same
manufacturers price t0L = t
e
H but it has to adjust quantities q
e
1, q
e
2 to meet the
market share threshold. The optimal adjustment implies a decrease in the quantity
q2 and an increase in the manufacturers quantity q1. Because of continuity of the
retailers prot function in q1and q2, for  small enough we have that the new
retailers prot is still higher than the reservation prot. Thus, if the new price t0
is o¤ered then the retailer chooses new quantity q01 > q
e
1. Given the manufacturers
price remains the same, t0L = t
e
H ; the prot of the manufacturer is higher. Thus
fteL; teH ; seg were not the equilibrium values which contradicts to the assumption.
Proof of the Corollary 1. I proof the statement by contradiction. Lets
ftL; tH ; sg and s be the equilibrium manufacturers menu of prices and the equi-
librium manufacturers market share respectively. By Lemma 1 s  s and the
retailer buys at the price tL.
Suppose s > s. Note that small changes in tL result in small changes in the
equilibrium quantities of q1, q2 and the condition s > s still holds.
If tL is higher (lower) than the equilibrium manufacturers wholesale price
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(which is 1
2
(1  b + c)) then a small decrease (increase) in tL leads to an increase
in the manufacturers prot MMSD with s > s still holding. Thus in equilibrium
tL =
1
2
(1   b + c) and the condition RMSD > 14 holds. Now, if the manufacturer
sets s0 = s +  then the retailer has either to trade the good 2 only or to adjust
quantities q1, q2 to meet new threshold requirement. In the former case the retailer
obtains its reservation prot only while in the latter case its prot decreases only
slightly and it still remains higher than the reservation prot. Thus the retailer
chooses to by more the manufacturers good at the same price. The prot of
the manufacturer is higher that contradict to assumption that ftL; tH ; sg was the
equilibrium menu of prices.
Proof of the Lemma 2. By Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 we have s = se and
hence MMSD = q1(t
e
L; s
e)(teL   c) = s
e(1 seteL)
2(1 2se(1 b)(1 se))(t
e
L   c).
Lets show that @
M
MSD
@tL
= s
2(c 2tL)+s
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s))  0.
First, because of 2s(1   b)(1   s)  max
s
2s(1   s)(1   b) = 1 b
2
< 1 =)
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) > 0. Hence the denominator is positive.
Second, the nominator is positive because
s2(c  2tL) + s > min
s
s2(c  2tL) + s = [s2(c  2tL) + s]
s= 1
2(2tL c)
= 0
for any tL  c
Thus, for any given level of se, MMSD is a non-decreasing in t
e
L function. Thus
the manufacturer sets teL to be as high as possible until 
R
MSD  14 .
The retailers prot RMSD is the deceasing in t
e
L function for any 0 < tL < 1.
Thus the manufacturer sets price such that RMSD =
1
4
.
Proof of the Proposition 2. 1). The manufacturers market share is s =
1 b c
(1 b)(2 c) in the case of MSDs and it is s
WP = q1
q1+q2
= 1 b c
(1 b)(3 c+b) in the case of
the WP contract. Because (3  c+ b) > 2 > (2  c) we have that s > sWP :
2). Now I show that tL =
(2 c)(1 b) D1
1 b c >
1
2
(1  b+ c) = !,
where D1 =
p
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2].
(2 c)(1 b) D1
1 b c >
1
2
(1  b+ c),
2(2  c)(1  b)  (1  b)2 + c2 > 2D1 ,
(1  b2) + (2(1  b)(1  c) + c2) > 2D1 ,p
(1  b2)2 +p[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2]2 > 2D1 ,
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(
p
(1  b2) p[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2])2 > 0:
Moreover 1   b2 = 2(1   c)(1   b) + c2 , 1   b   c = 0 which contradicts to
the assumption. Thus tL > !:
3). qMSD1 =
1 b c
2D1
> 1 b c
4(1 b2) = q
WP
1 , D1 < 2(1  b2),
2(1  c)(1  b) + c2 < 4(1  b2):
By the assumption c < 1  b)
2(1  c)(1  b) + c2 < 2(1  c)(1  b) + (1  b)2 =
= (1  b)[2(1  c) + (1  b)] = (1  b)[3  2c  b] <
< 3(1  b) < 4(1  b2):
4). qMSD1 > q
WP
1 and t

L > ! give that 
M
MSD > 
M
WP :
5). Competitive sectors rms outputs in cases of WP and MSDs contracts
are qWP2 =
2 b b2+bc
4(1 b2) and q
MSD
2 =
1 b+bc
2D1
respectively.
First, lets note that D1 > 1  b2 because ofp
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2]  min
c
p
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2] =
=
p
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2] jc=1 b = (1  b2)
Thus qMSD2 =
1 b+bc
2D1
< 1 b+bc
2(1 b2) =
2 2b+2bc
4(1 b2) :
Note that 2  2b+ 2bc < 2  b  b2 + bc,
b(b+ c  1) < 0 which holds by the assumption. Thus qMSD2 < qWP2 .
6) and (7). The changes in prices are the immediate result of changes in
quantities. Thus both the increase in q1 and the decrease in q2 result in the
decrease in p1 and the increase in p2:
8). RWP =
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) > 1=4 = 
R
MSD
because of 5 3b
2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) >
1
4
,
5  3b2   2b(1  c)  (2  c)c > 4(1  b2),
(b+ c)2   2(b+ c) + 1 > 0, (1  b  c)2 > 0:
9). Substituting equilibriums values of prices and quantities for both cases of
the wholesale price and MSDs we get that the consumerssurpluses are:
CSWP = 5 4b
2+(b+c)2+(b+c)
32(1 b2) and CS
MSD = 1
8
. Thus CSWP > CSMSD ,
5 4b2+(b+c)2+(b+c)
32(1 b2) >
1
8
, 1 + (b + c)2   2(b + c) > 0 , (1  b  c)2 > 0 where the
last inequality is obviously true.
Proof of the Lemma 3. Suppose, in the equilibrium the manufacturer sets
fteL; teH ; seg and the retailer does not meet the market share threshold, s 6= se.
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Because in the equilibrium s 6= se; the level of the market threshold se has no
e¤ects on quantities qe1, q
e
2.
Suppose that e = 1: In this case the equilibrium price (either teH if s < s
e or
teL if s > s
e) coincides with the price b!. But this contradicts to the assumption 3
which says that the manufacturers prot is higher if its price is ! = 1
2
(1  b+ c)
and e = 0. Thus if e = 1 it must be that s = se.
Suppose that e = 0: Then because of s 6= se the manufacturers price (either
teH if s < s
e or teL if s > s
e) equals to its wholesale price ! = 1
2
(1   b + c): As a
result, the equilibrium retailers prot is RMSD =
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) >
1
4
.
Let consider new menu of prices t0 = ft0L; t0H ; s0g in the form:8><>:
t0L = t
e
H
t0H = +1
s0 = se + 
,
where  > 0.
Now lets show that the new price t0 gives the higher prot to the manufacturer.
Because t0H = +1, the retailer have either to meet the market share threshold
s0 or to trade the competitive sectors rm good only. To exclude the manufac-
turers good from the trade is not protable because in this case the retailer obtains
its reservation prot only. In the former case, the retailer has to adjust quanti-
ties qe1, q
e
2 to meet the market share threshold. The retailer may change its e¤ort
level to e = 1 also. Regardless changes in the e¤ort level, the optimal adjustment
implies an increase in the manufacturers quantity q1. Because of the continuity
of the retailers prot function in q1and q2, for  small enough the new retailers
prot is still higher than its reservation prot. Thus, if the new menu of prices t0 is
o¤ered then the retailer chooses new quantity q01 > q
e
1. Given the manufacturers
price remains the same, t0L = t
e
H ; the prot of the manufacturer is higher. Thus
fteL; teH ; seg were not the equilibrium values which contradicts to assumption.
Proof of the Lemma 4. Suppose, in the equilibrium the manufacturer sets
fteL; teH ; seg : By Lemma 3 s = se:
Suppose the equilibrium level of the retailers e¤ort is e = 0: Then all argu-
ments of the Lemma 2 applied with small di¤erence in the following way.
First, MMSD(t
e
L; s
e) = q1(t
e
L; s
e)(teL   c) = s
e(1 seteL)
2(1 2se(1 b)(1 se))(t
e
L   c),
with @
M
MSD
@tL
= s
2(c 2tL)+s
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s))  0 for any tL < (1+cs)2s .
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Thus, for any given level of se, MMSD is non-decreasing in t
e
L function for
tL <
(1+cs)
2s
If RMSD(t
e
L; s
e)

e=0 > 1=4 then the manufacturer may increase its
prot by an increase in teL. The retailers response on an increase in t
e
L may imply
changes in both the e¤ort level and in quantities q1; q2. Regardless changes in the
retailers e¤ort level, the prot of the manufacturers increases for any tL <
(1+cs)
2s
:
The prot of the retailer decreases in tL and it is less then 14 at tL =
(1+cs)
2s
:Thus,
if e = 0, the optimal manufacturers price is such that RMSD

e=0
= 1
4
.
Now suppose the equilibrium level of the retailers e¤ort is e = 1 and the
retailers prot is RMSD(t
e
L; s
e)

e=1
> 1=4. If the manufacturer increases its price
to tL = t
e
L+ then the retailers response may imply changes in both the e¤ort level
and quantities q1; q2. If the retailer changes the e¤ort level, then RMSD

e=0
= 1
4
as it was shown above. Given that  > 0 is small enough, an adjustment in
quantities still provide the retailer with RMSD(t

L; s
e)

e=1
> 1=4: The prot of
the manufacturer MMSD(tL; s)

e=1
increases while the retailers prot RMSD

e=1
decreases for t < 1+(A1 1)s+cs
2s
with RMSD

e=1
< 1=4 if t = 1+(A1 1)s+cs
2s
. Thus, if
e = 1, the manufacturers optimal price is such that RMSD(tL; s)

e=1
= 1=4:
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